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Abstract
It is shown that the combination of a unitary quantum theory and
special relativity may lead to a contradiction when considering the
statistics of certain measurement results in different Lorentz frames in
a Gedankenexperiment. This result seems to imply that either unitary
quantum theories are wrong or if a unitary quantum theory is right
then there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame.
It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativ-
ity are compatible. In 1964, based on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
argument [1], Bell derived an important result that was later called Bell’s
theorem [2]. It states that certain predictions of quantum mechanics cannot
be accounted for by any local realistic theory, and thus strongly suggests
that quantum mechanics and special relativity are incompatible. However,
there have been controversies on the underlying assumptions and deep im-
plications of Bell’s theorem [3-5]. Moreover, there are also unitary quantum
theories (without wave function collapse) which claim that they can avoid
the nonlocality consequence of Bell’s theorem and are compatible with spe-
cial relativity [6-11]. In this paper, I will give a simple proof of the incom-
patibility between unitary quantum theories and special relativity based on
an analysis of a Wigner’s friend variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment. The
work can be regarded as a further development of Bell’s theorem.
Consider a usual EPR-Bohm experiment. There are two observers Alice
and Bob who are in their separate laboratories and share an EPR pair of
spin 1/2 particles in the spin singlet state:
1√
2
(|up〉1 |down〉2 − |down〉1 |up〉2). (1)
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Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at angle a, and Bob measures the spin
of particle 2 at angle b. Each measurement result is +1 or −1, corresponding
to spin up or spin down. Then we can calculate the probabilistic correlation
function E(a, b) for Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results according to the
Born rule, which is E(a, b) = −cos(a − b). In particular, in the EPR anti-
correlation case of b = a, we have E(a, b) = −1, which means that when
Alice’s result is +1, Bob’s result is −1, and vice versa.
Now consider a Wigner’s friend variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment
in which there is an additional superobserver who can undo a measurement
[12-18]. The existence of such superobservers is permitted in principle by a
unitary quantum theory. First, suppose in the laboratory frame (in which
Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories are at rest), Alice first measures the spin of
particle 1 at angle a and obtains her result, then the superobserver undoes
Alice’s measurement (which restores the states of Alice and the particles
to their initial states, see [18]), and then Alice measures again the spin of
particle 1 at angle a and obtains her second result, and then the superob-
server undoes Alice’s second measurement, and this process repeats a large
number of times, and finally Bob measures the spin of particle 2 at angle
b = a. According to the Born rule, the probability distribution of Alice’s
results is P (+1) = 1/2 and P (−1) = 1/2.
Next, suppose in the laboratory frame Bob first measures the spin of
particle 2 at angle b = a, and then Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at
angle a and obtains her result, and then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
measurement, and then Alice measures again the spin of particle 1 at angle
a and obtains her second result, and then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
second measurement, and this process in Alice’s side repeats a large number
of times. In this case, according to the Born rule, the probability distribution
of Alice’s results is P (+1) = 1 and P (−1) = 0 (when Bob’s result is −1) or
P (+1) = 0 and P (−1) = 1 (when Bob’s result is +1).
It can be seen that Bob’s measurement influences the results of Alice’s
measurements (when assuming there is no superdeterminism). When Bob
does not make a measurement before Alice’s measurements, the probability
distribution of Alice’s results is P (+1) = 1/2 and P (−1) = 1/2, while when
Bob makes a measurement before Alice’s measurements, the probability
distribution of Alice’s results is a different one, which is either P (+1) = 1
and P (−1) = 0 or P (+1) = 0 and P (−1) = 1. When Bob’s measurement is
spacelike separated from Alice’s measurements, this influence will be faster
than light or even instantaneous, which is inconsistent with the spirit of
special relatvity.
Note that the above analysis does not concern merely a theoretical prob-
ability distribution but an actual frequency. In the Gedankenexperiments,
Alice can repeat her measurement many times, and she will either obtain
the same result each time, or spin up and spin down with roughly equal fre-
quency - even though she is unable to remember or report these statistics.
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Indeed, at the end of these experiments, all of Alice’s measurement results
except the last one (observed in some inertial frames) are erased by the su-
perobserver. As thus, the statistics of Alice’s results can only be calculated
from a theory, and it cannot be found by the experiments. This is consistent
with the no-signaling theorem.
Notwithstanding the consistency with the no-signaling theorem, unitary
quantum theories and special relativity are incompatible. Here is a rigorous
proof. Suppose in the laboratory frame Alice and the superobserver first
make their series of measurements and then Bob makes his measurement.
Then Alice will obtain two different results, spin up and spin down, with
roughly equal frequency. Then when Bob’s measurement is spacelike sepa-
rated from Alice’s and the superobserver’s measurements, the following time
order of events in another inertial frame is permitted by special relativity.1
In the frame, Bob first makes his measurement, and then Alice and the su-
perobserver make their series of measurements. Then Alice will obtain the
same result each time, either spin up or spin down. Since the results of the
same measurement observed in two Lorentz frames should be the same, we
have derived a contradiction.
A similar contradiction can also be derived from an analysis of single
measurement results. Consider again the EPR anti-correlation case of b = a.
Suppose in the laboratory frame, Alice first measures the spin of particle 1
at angle a and obtains her result, then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
measurement, which restores the states of Alice and the particles to their
initial states, and finally Bob measures the spin of particle 2 at angle b = a
and obtains his result. When Bob’s measurement is spacelike separated
from the superobserver’s reset operation, the following time order of events
in another Lorentz frame is permitted by special relativity. In this frame,
Alice first measures the spin of particle 1 at angle a and obtains her result,
then Bob measures the spin of particle 2 at angle b = a and obtains his result,
and finally the superobserver undoes Alice’s measurement. According to the
Born rule, in this frame, when the result of Alice’s measurement is +1, the
result of Bob’s measurement must be −1 with certainty. On the other hand,
in the laboratory frame, when the result of Alice’s measurement is +1, the
result of Bob’s measurement cannot be −1 with certainty. The reason is
that if the result of Bob’s measurement is −1 with certainty, then if Alice
makes her second measurement her result will be +1 with certainty, which
further means that if Alice and the superobserver repeat their measurements
a large number of times, Alice’s results will be all +1, which violates the
Born rule.2 Thus we also have a contradiction.
1Note that when the distance between Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories is very large and
the duration between Alice’s and the superobserver’s measurements and Bob’s measure-
ment is very short, the relative velocity between this inertial frame and the laboratory
frame may be close to zero.
2Strictly speaking, when the result of Alice’s measurement is +1, it is possible that the
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It can be seen that the above contradiction results from the combination
of a unitary quantum theory and special relativity. A unitary quantum
theory permits the existence of the superobserver’s reset operations due to
the universal validity of the Schro¨dinger equation and gives the Born rule
for the measurement results of Alice and Bob, and special relativity permits
the change of time order of events such as these measurements in different
Lorentz frames. It is these two elements in combination that lead to the
contradiction in the above Gedankenexperiments. Note that the unitary
quantum theory used here is composed of the universal Schro¨dinger equation
and the Born rule, which is the core of quantum mechanics. Moreover, the
analysis concerns only its predictions for the measurement results, and thus
the validity of the analysis does not depend on any further interpretation
of quantum mechanics beyond its core, such as the ontological status and
meaning of the wave function and how to solve the measurement problem
etc.
Avoiding the above contradiction requires that either unitary quantum
theories are wrong or special relativity is wrong. If unitary quantum theories
are wrong, e.g. in some collapse theories in which the collapse of the wave
function is time irreversible, then the superobserver who can undo a mea-
surement will not exist, and the above contradiction can be avoided.3 On
the other hand, if a unitary quantum theory is right, then special relativity
must be violated. Concretely speaking, in a unitary quantum theory there
must exist a preferred Lorentz frame, in which the time order of events is
real and the predictions of the theory are true, while in other Lorentz frames
the time order of events may be apparent and the predictions of the theory
such as the Born rule may be not true.4 Moreover, in a unitary quantum
theory there are faster than light influences induced by measurements, and
the preferred Lorentz frame can be defined as the Lorentz frame in which
these influences happen instantaneously.
Finally, I will briefly discuss the possible implications of the above re-
sult for several unitary quantum theories. The first one is hidden-variable
theories such as Bohm’s theory and the modal interpretation. It has been
shown that in these theories special relativity is violated and a preferred
Lorentz frame exists at the assumed ontological level [21,22]. For example,
in Bohm’s theory, the joint distributions given by the Born rule for position
measurements cannot in general agree with the distributions of the actual
result of Bob’s measurement is −1 with certainty, but the probability of this possibility is
zero according to the Born rule. This means that if Alice and the superobserver repeat
their measurements, the probability of Alice’s results being all +1 is zero (when the times
of measurements approach infinity), which is in accordance with the Born rule.
3It seems that there is also a nonzero probability that a measurement can be undone
in collapse theories with tails. Then the above analysis may be also valid even for these
collapse theories.
4Similar results have also been obtained in [19,20].
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Bohmian particle positions in all Lorentz frames. The above result further
shows that a preferred Lorentz frame must also exist in these theories when
considering only actually observed measurement results.
It is worth noting that the above proof may have a loophole in deter-
ministic nonlocal hidden-variable theories such as Bohm’s theory. In these
theories, when the superobserver’s reset operation is an exact time-reversal,5
it will also restore the exact initial values of all hidden variables such as the
initial positions of all the Bohmian particles. Then, in the above Gedanken-
experiments, the results of Alice’s measurements will be all the same, in-
dependently of Bob’s measurement6, and thus the above result cannot be
derived. Interestingly, however, a further analysis of the invariance of the
results of Alice’s and Bob’s spacelike separated measurements in different
Lorentz frames also shows that these theories are incompatible with special
relativity and require the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame [27].
Another well-known unitary quantum theory is Everett’s theory or the
many-worlds theory. It is widely thought that the many-worlds theory is
consistent with special relativity, and the consistency is a major advantage
of the theory. Then, does the above result also hold true in the many-
worlds theory? I think the answer may be positive. The reason is that the
derivations of the contradiction are based only on the Schro¨dinger equation
and the Born rule, and the predictions of the many-worlds theory for the
statistics of Alice’s results in all worlds are the same as the above. For
example, if Bob makes his measurement at last, the statistics of Alice’s
results will be 50% and 50% for spin up and spin down in each world. While
if Bob first makes his measurement, Alice’s results will be all spin up in
one world, and all spin down in the other world.7 This means that the
contradiction will exist in each world in the many-worlds theory.
It can be seen that the usual way of the many-worlds theory to avoid
Bell’s theorem is not available here, since the first derivation concerns only
the statistics of Alice’s own results, and no correlation between Alice’s re-
sults and Bob’s result is involved in the derivation. Moreover, it has been
shown that in the EPR anti-correlation case or parallel case, unlike the
non-parallel cases, the many-worlds theory does not require that a joint
measurement should be performed, comparing the results from Alice and
5In general, the superobserver’s reset operation is not necessarily an exact time-reversal,
and it only needs to restore the initial state of Alice and the initial spin states of the
particles.
6When Bob makes his measurement at last, the statistics of Alice’s results will violate
the Born rule, and the violation may exist in all Lorentz frames. Although this is under-
standable in a deterministic hidden-variable theory and does not contradict experience, it
suggests that an indeterministic hidden-variable theory is more consistent with quantum
mechanics [24-26].
7Note that in Wallace’s (2012) formulation of the many-worlds theory the number
of the emergent worlds after a measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of
decoherence. This does not influence the analysis here.
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Bob, which can only take place in the overlap of the future light cones of the
measurements of Alice and Bob, in order to make definite spin and outcome
states from one side definite relative to definite spin and outcome states from
the other8; rather, following the two local measurements of Alice and Bob,
from the point of view of one side, the states of the systems in the other side
already correspond to a definite, perfectly anti-correlated, measurement re-
sult [6]. Thus, the second derivation of the contradiction, which is based on
an analysis of single measurement results, is also valid in the many-worlds
theory, since it concerns only the EPR anti-correlation case.
How about other unitary quantum theories such as consistent histories
[7], retrocausal theories [8], relational quantum mechanics [9], quantum per-
spectivalism [10], QBism [11], and superdeterminism? It seems that they
will give the same predictions for the statistics of Alice’s results as above
(otherwise they will violate the Born rule), and thus the (first) derivation
of the contradiction is still valid in these theories. In particular, since the
derivation concerns only the statistics of the results obtained by Alice herself,
it seems that even relationalism and QBism cannot avoid the contradiction
either.
The only way to avoid the contradiction seems to insist that the statistics
of Alice’s results does not exist or cannot be defined. If there is no such a
thing, then the analysis based on it will be invalid. Indeed, even though Alice
can repeat her measurement many times, she will not be able to remember
or report the statistics of these results in a unitary quantum theory. But
this is only an impossibility of testing certain predictions of a theory at the
empirical level,9 while what we consider here is whether the predictions of
two theories are compatible at the theoretical level. After all, the statistics
of the results of Alice’s repeated measurements in each Lorentz frame can be
properly defined and also precisely predicted by a unitary quantum theory
and special relativity.10 The result I have derived above is just that the
combination of these two theories will lead to a contradiction when consid-
ering their predictions for the statistics of Alice’s results in different Lorentz
frames.
To sum up, I have argued that the combination of a unitary quantum
theory and special relativity may lead to a contradiction when considering
8According to the reasoning, in the non-parallel cases, we can only think of the correla-
tions between measurement results on the two sides of the experiment actually obtaining
in the overlap of the future light-cones of the measurement events, and thus there will be
no violation of special relativity [6].
9This does raise an interesting issue in philosophy of science.
10In addition, it is worth pointing out that whether the statistics of Alice’s results
exists or not (when she cannot remember or report the statistics) does not depend on any
quantum theory, and it is purely a classical issue. Thus, if the existence of the statistics is
denied, then the denial will also change our current understandings of classical mechanics.
It seems, at least to me, that the change will lead to a very limited worldview or even
solipsism (see also [27]).
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the statistics of certain measurement results in different Lorentz frames.
This result seems to imply that either unitary quantum theories are wrong
or if a unitary quantum theory is right then there must exist a preferred
Lorentz frame.
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